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I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I oughr to do. Are 
these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m 
sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought 
to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately 
what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenu- 
ity. I have in mind here an “all things considered” ought that I can use in my 
thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by 
sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this 
ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of 
what to do 
Let’s experiment, then, with accepting this suggestion. It commits us to 
something of theoretical import. The answer to an ought question is a state- 
ment; I can state this: I ought to speak loudly enough in public that people 
can hear. If I settle what to do, though, I voice my conclusion not with a 
statement, but with something like an imperative: “Speak audibly,” I might 
tell myself. If the question of how loudly to speak is open, then my words 
express a decision-whereas if I say “I ought to speak audibly,” my words 
seem to express a belief, a belief as to what I ought to do. Can a decision, 
then, also be a belief? And if so, what is the content of this belief? 
To explore the hypothesis I have broached, I shall look not at how our 
words and concepts do work, but at how they might work if the hypothesis 
were correct. The claim I’ll argue is this: Being in the business of acting and 
planning commits us to something ought-like. If the ought I have suggested 
we find in our thoughts did not exist, we’d be committed to its invention. It 
is in the nature of living, deciding, and planning that the thinking involved 
acts as if it were coping with facts-with facts of a special kind, facts of what 
one ought to do. 
What kinds of facts are these? My answer will be a little complex, and i t  
will be somewhat Moorean: it will fit a plausible reading and emendation of 
G. E. Moore’s doctrines. At this point in my exposition, I’ll have to be 
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oracular: First, I say, given my circumstances, there is a property of being 
the thing to do in those circumstances. This property isn’t in any way 
“queer”, as Mackie might charge;’ in a sense, it is an ordinary, natural prop- 
erty-though it may be a complex one, the resultant of a delicate balancing of 
considerations. On this score, I am somewhat like the “naturalistic moral 
realists” centered at Cornell University.2 They think that moral terms like 
‘just’ and ‘good’ refer to natural properties. For purposes here, we might 
invent a Cornell-like character, the “naturalistic practical realist”, who main- 
tains that the phrase “the thing to do” likewise picks out a natural pro pert^.^ I 
am saying that, insofar as this particular doctrine goes, this naturalistic prac- 
tical realist is right. Indeed for all my arguments show, this property might 
be something straightforward like pleasure, or more precisely, holding out 
maximal prospects for net pleasure. The metapractical arguments in this paper 
will leave it entirely open what this property is. This part of my doctrine is 
Moorean, in that G. E. Moore spoke somewhat obscurely about “the good” 
-which, he allowed, might be pleasure, say, for all his arguments strictly 
about meaning show: I read Moore as getting at just what I’m saying here. 
For a given set of circumstances, there is a property of being the thing to do 
in those circumstances, and this property more or less fits Moore’s notion of 
a natural property. 
On the other hand-again with Moore, as I read him-I want to insist that 
the concept of being the thing to do is quite special. It is different from any 
descriptive concept of a natural property. To apply this concept to an act that 
is open to one is to settle on the act, to decide to do it. No naturalistic, 
descriptive concept has this feature. I have characterized this concept of “being 
the thing to do” so that a form of “internalism” applies to it automatically, 
the kind that Stephen Darwall calls “judgment internali~m”.~ As Mackie 
might put it, the concept has to-be-doneness built into it.6 I’ll be arguing, 
though, that while practical concepts are special in this regard, they needn’t be 
“queer” or mysterious in any way. They work just as we should expect as we 
investigate decision and contingency planning. 
My argument, then, will take the form of a possibility proof. I won’t be 
claiming anything directly about our actual concepts. I will be claiming that 
planning involves commitment to a predicate, a predicate that acts much as 
’ Mackie, Ethics (1977), pp. 28-42, offers an “argument from queerness” against 
objective ethical properties. 
Boyd, “How to Be a Moral Realist” (1988); Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations” (1985). 
Sturgeon, in “Gibbard (1985), p. 26, discusses definitions which “do not pretend to be 
analytic” and, “when correct, tell us the nature of what the term refers to.” 
Peter Railton suggested the phrase “the thing to do” to me as best capturing the concept I 
want to study. 
Moore, Principia Erhica (1903), pp. 8-9. 
Darwall, “Internalism and Agency” (1992), pp. 16062. 
Mackie, Erltics (1977). p. 40. 
’ 
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Moore thought the predicate ‘is good’ acts. The planner is committed to 
thinking that this predicate signifies a natural property, a property of acts in 
their contexts. He is also committed to treating this predicate as special, as 
characterized by motivational judgment internalism-and so not equivalent to 
any naturalistic-descriptive predicate. The doctrine I’ll claim to establish, 
then, amounts to naturalism for practical properties, and non-naturalism for 
practical concepts. 
Simon Blackburn has long pursued a program he labels “quasi-realism”. In 
the normative realm, this consists in starting from a non-descriptive account 
of normative concepts, and then showing that from this account it follows 
that they behave very much like descriptive concepts? My talk of a natural 
property that constitutes being the thing to do may sound too metaphysical to 
Blackburn, but I think of what I’ll be saying as realizing his program. If I am 
right, then many of the contrasts that have been supposed to distinguish ‘‘real- 
ism” from “antirealism” in ethics fail in fact to do so. My treatment of 
normative concepts is distinctive not because I deny that they pick out natural 
properties-for in a sense, I don’t deny this-but in my account of how they 
do so, of how normative concepts pick out natural properties: they do so, I 
say, by expressing aspects of a general policy for living. 
The argument will proceed in a number of steps. I start with decision and 
planning, and expressions of the conclusions one arrives at in planning. “In 
poisonous snake country, step on a fallen log and not over it,” I can tell 
myself, and I thereby express a conclusion I arrive at in my contingency 
planning. What, then, licenses me to express this as a statement? I state, “In 
snake country with a log across the path, the thing to do is to step on the 
log, not over it.” How I can do this is, in effect, the dread ‘Frege-Geach” 
problem that Geach and Searle developed for certain kinds of metaethical theo- 
ries.’ I offered a solution to this problem in my book of several years ago? 
and I’ll ask what it is about planning and the like that allows this solution to 
go through. My quasi-realistic contentions will then fall out of this solution 
to the Frege-Geach problem: that given a situation in which one must decide, 
there is a natural property that constitutes being the thing to do in that situa- 
tion. If the language as I describe it doesn’t already exist as our normative 
language, it is available to be invented-and it will be hard to see how we 
could have gotten along for so long without it. 
A parenthetical note before I proceed: I’ll be ignoring all questions of 
indifference, all questions of ties in the outcome of deliberation. I believe I 
could, with more discussion, allow that a planner might find more than one 
option admissible, and so think no act uniquely the thing to do. It will 
’ 
* Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (1993), p. 15. Searle, “Meaning and Speech Acts” (1962); Geach, “Assertion” (1965). 
Gibbard. Wise Choices (1990). 83-102. 
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simplify matters, though, to leave all such tied outcomes to one side, and 
explore some other time whether Buridan’s ass could find cause to balk at my 
treatment. 
1. Thinking What to Do 
Holmes is stalked by Moriarty, imagine. He plans to escape by train, packing 
as late as possible to conceal his intentions. By now, though, it may be too 
late to catch the train-in which case packing is useless. Thinking through 
the considerations, he decides to start packing. He says, 
Packing is now the thing to do. (1) 
We explain easily what his words mean; they simply express his decision to 
pack. 
Now the Frege-Geach problem raises its head. Holmes ascribed a predrcate 
to packing; he predicated of it being now the thing to do. We haven’t, though, 
explained this as ascribing a property to packing, some “queer” property laden 
with to-be-doneness; his words simply expressed his decision. But the predi- 
cate can appear in a wide variety of other contexts too, contexts in which no 
decision is being expressed. Holmes might have said this to himself 
Eitherpacking is now the thing to do, or by now it’s too late to catch 
the train anyway. (2) 
He could then include this disjunction in an argument. Join (2) with the 
premise 
It’s not even now too late to catch the train. (3) 
The conclusion seems to follow, 
:. Packing is now the thing to do. (1) 
How, then, do we explain what is meant by ‘is the thing to do’ in a 
disjunctive context like (2)? This predicate figures in Holmes’s reasoning, 
and seems, in this deduction, to act much like any other predicate. What 
makes his reasoning valid, if it is-and why, here, does validity seem to act 
so much like validity in reasoning with plain descriptive predicates? 
To accept the disjunction (2) all by itself isn’t to make a decision; (2) 
doesn’t tell Holmes straight out what to do. As we have seen, though, it can 
bear on what to do. Put disjunction (2) together with the descriptive premise 
(3), and Holmes can reason to a decision. 
What does Holmes do in accepting a disjunction like (2)? What, indeed, do 
I do in accepting any disjunction? I rule out a possibility. A disjunction (A or 
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B), as we all know, precludes the case whereA and B are both false. The force 
of the precluding is this: If I accept (A or B), I can’t then come both to reject 
A and to reject B-unless, that is, I change my mind, either knowingly or by 
losing track of my thinking. 
What, then, of an argument, (A or B), not A, therefore B? With the first I 
rule out this: coming both to reject A and to reject B. With the second I reject 
A. The combined effect, then, is to rule out rejecting B. It would therefore be 
inconsistent of me to accept the premises and reject the conclusion: I would 
be doing what I had ruled out doing. 
This explanation applies whether or not the disjunctive reasoning is 
couched in terms that are purely descriptive. It applies to reasoning from a 
descriptive disjunction (A or B), and it applies equally to Holmes’s reasoning 
from the mixed descriptive-practical disjunction (2). If Holmes accepts the 
disjunction (2), he rules out the following: coming both (i) to reject its being 
too late to catch the train and (ii) to reject packing. With (3), he rejects its 
being too late to catch the train. He has thus ruled out rejecting packing. 
It would be good to have a way to keep track of such inferential import. 
How might we code the inferential import of disjunctions and the like? 
Holmes’s disjunction (2) rules something out: it rules out a combined state of 
describing and deciding, of judging how things are and judging what to do. 
Two issues are in play, one an issue of how things are, and one an issue of 
what to do: 
a) whether it’s too late to catch the train, and 
b) whether to start packing. 
This makes for four possible combinations of pertinent settled belief and deci- 
sion-four combinations that Holmes might come to if he settles his mind 
on both of these matters: 
C L P :  Believing it’s too late and deciding to pack 
C L P :  Believing it’s too late and deciding not to pack 
C L P :  Believing it’s not too late and deciding to pack 
C L P :  Believing it’s not too late and deciding not to pack 
Since these are the states of mind he can be in if he has decided both what to 
believe and what to do, I’ll call them decided states. We can now represent 
the content of the disjunction (2) by which of these dmded states it rules out 
and which it doesn’t. What it rules out is C L p ,  believing it’s not too late and 
still deciding not to pack. The disjunction rules out none of the other three 
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decided states: C L p ,  C L p  and C L ~ .  Say, then, that a judgment allows a 
decided state just in case it doesn’t rule it out. (For a judgment to “allow” a 
decided state, then, is not for it to preclude ruling that state out; it is just for 
that judgment not by itself to rule out that decided state.) The content of the 
disjunction (2). then, we can represent by the set { C L p ,  C L p ,  C L~ ) of ds 
cided states it allows. It rules out all decided states but these-that is, it rules 
out the single decided state C ~ p .  
What is it about decision that makes such a solution work? We cannot 
just coin predicates to do any linguistic work whatsoever: Dreier imagines 
inventing a predicate ‘is hiyo’ to be used in accosting: If I say ‘Bob is hiyo’, 
that’s just a declarative style of saying “Hey, Bob!” I can’t, though, reason to 
an accosting, and a disjunction using this purported predicate would make no 
sense.” Try saying this: 
Bob is in a hurry or he is hiyo. (4) 
To ascribe ‘is hiyo’ to a person, we have explained, is to hail him, but this 
explanation fails to give any meaning to a disjunction like (4). We cannot 
transform hailings, then, into ascriptions of predicates. Why think we can so 
transform expressions of decisions? 
Two observation may serve to answer Dreier’s challenge. First, the 
scheme I have sketched applies only to expressions of states of mind. Prosai- 
cally factual statements are expressions of prosaically factual beliefs, and 
“thing to do” statements, as I am treating them, are expressions of decisions, 
actual or hypothetical. Second, though, and crucially, the states of mind 
expressed can be agreed with or disagreed with. A groan, say, might express a 
headache, but there’s no agreeing or disagreeing with a headache. A decision, 
in contrast, is something one can agree with or disagree with. One can stick 
with it over time, or change one’s mind, and different people, at different 
times, can agree with it or disagree with it. Disagreement holds the key: the 
possibility of agreeing or disagreeing with a state of mind makes that state of 
mind act logically like accepting a claim.” Charles Stevenson was quite right 
to begin his presentation of emotivism with disagreement: he begins with 
“disagreement in attitude”, a kind of disagreement that can mimic, in impor- 
tant ways, disagreement in belief.’* One can’t agree or disagree with a hail- 
ing-though one can agree or disagree with a decision to hail, or with a 
belief, say, that Bob has been hailed. Likewise with headaches. But I can 
agree or disagree with Holmes’ decision to pack-and Holmes might later 
himself come to disagree with it. 
lo 
‘ I  
Dreier, “Expressivist Embeddings” (1996), pp. 4 2 4 .  
Brandom, Making It  Explicit (1994). 592-97 and elsewhere, discusses the making of a 
single claim from multiple perspectives. 
Stevenson, Erhics and Language (1944). 2-8. 
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This is what allows the simple apparatus I have constructed. Let me now 
expand the apparatus. Holmes makes not only decisions for what to do on the 
spot, but contingency plans: he can decide to flee the station if the train is 
more than two minutes late. I myself can decide hypothetically for the same 
situation: I can decide what to do for the case of being Holmes in that situa- 
tion. I decide, suppose, “If in that situation, stay at the station, but pay a cab 
to speed off as a decoy.” In that case, I disagree with Holmes’s own decision 
for that circumstance. 
Back, then, to decided states. We can now imagine, as an idealization, my 
reaching a state of mind that is decided on everything. In such a hyperdecided 
state, I would have a complete view, correct or incorrect, about everything 
that might be the case in the world, and I would have a universal plan for 
life, a plan that covers, in detail, every possible situation one could be in that 
calls for a decision. We can now represent the force of, say, disjunction by 
specifying in which such hyperdecided states I would not have changed my 
mind about the disjunction. I would accept the disjunction if and only if I 
accepted one of its disjuncts. 
All of truth-functional logic can be put in these terms. Inconsistency in 
one’s descriptive-practical state of mind consists in this: there being no 
possible hyperdecided state one could reach without rejecting something one 
now accepts. And we have this important principle: One is committed to 
everything one couldn’t consistently reject without changing one’s mind 
about something. Therefore, suppose I would accept a claim C in every 
possible hyperdecided state I could reach without changing my mind about 
something-without rejecting something I now accept. Then I am already 
committed to claim C. This is a principle I will cite in my crucial argument 
of the next section of the paper: Take any claim C. Suppose that for every 
hyperdecided state I could reach without changing my mind, I would accept C 
if in that state. Then, the principle says, I am already committed to C. 
As an illustration, the principle underwrites this logical truism: Suppose 
P&Q entails S and P&-Q entails S; then P entails S by itself. A friend Jane, 
suppose, accepts P, that you speak Polish. She might then refine her views 
by coming to accept Q as well, that you speak Quechua, or might refine her 
views by coming to accept -Q. Indeed any way whatsoever of becoming 
coherently hyperdecided without changing her mind about anything consists, 
among other things, either in accepting P&Q or in accepting P &-Q. P &Q 
entails S, that you can speak, in that any coherent way of accepting P&Q ad 
being decided on S consists, among other thing, in accepting S. Likewise for 
P &- Q. Hence since both entail S, any coherent way she has of being decided 
on S without changing her mind on P involves accepting S. Thus P entails S; 
the principle has done its work. 
SYMPOSIUM 157 
2. Natural Constitution 
When I announced at the outset what I would be claiming, I distinguished 
concepts and properties. The property of being the thing to do, I said, is a 
natural property, but the concept of being the thing to do isn’t a descriptive 
concept of that property. The kind of contrast I have in mind figures in this 
stock example: Consider a pre-scientific concept of being water, and the 
chemical concept of being H20, having molecules with two hydrogen atoms 
and an oxygen atom. These are different concepts; it comes as a discovery that 
water is H 2 0 .  Mastery of the concepts alone isn’t sufficient to yield this 
discovery. Still, just one property is in play: the property of being H20.  The 
term ‘water’, we could say, signifies this property, and so does the term 
‘H20’. The property of being H20 is what constitutes being water: in any 
possible situation, all and only water is H20. 
A similar pattern holds for being the thing to do and some natural prop- 
erty. Logical apparatus won’t settle by itself what this property is. Rather, to 
say what natural property this is would be to offer an answer, in complete and 
fundamental terms, to the general question of how to live. I won’t be offer- 
ing any such general answer; I only wish I could. Let me illustrate the possi- 
bilities, however, by exploring what is perhaps the most prominent answer to 
the question of how to live, egoistic hedonism. One accepts this answer if 
one decides, as one’s plan for how to live, always to do whatever maximizes 
one’s hedonic prospects, one’s prospects for a balance of pleasure over 
displeasure in one’s life. Much debate among philosophers has comd 
what pleasure is and how most effectively to pursue it, but for my illustrative 
purposes, let’s suppose that these questions are answered. 
Hedda, imagine, is a hedonistic egoist: her contingency plan is always, in 
any possible situation, to do what maximizes her hedonic prospects. She 
thinks, then, that in any possible situation, the thing to do is the thing that 
maximizes one’s hedonic prospects. This amounts to saying, as I’ll put it, 
that maximizing one’s hedonic prospects is what constitutes being the thing 
to do. “Constitution” here works on a parallel to a way we might understand 
water and H20: just as any possible situation, something is water iff it is 
H20, so in any possible situation, according to Hedda, something is the thing 
to do just in case it maximizes the agent’s hedonic prospects. 
Is this really a matter of constituting? Does Hedda, in making a contin- 
gency plan, really commit herself to anything so metaphysical sounding as 
this? There are a multitude of ways of thinking about properties, concepts, 
and constitution, and I couldn’t hope to prove that my terminology fits all 
these ways. Here, though, is how I propose to think about the matter. Con- 
stitution, we can say, involves being coextensive necessarily. To say that two 
concepts are necessarily coextensive is just to say that for every possible 
situation to which the concepts apply, all and only things that fall under the 
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one fall under the other. Being H20 constitutes being water, after all, in that 
in any possible situation, all and only H 2 0  would be water.I3 Now according 
to Hedda, all and only acts that maximize the agent’s hedonic prospects are 
the thing to do. In other words, in her opinion, the concept of being the thing 
to do is coextensive with that of maximizing one’s hedonic prospects. Indeed 
this holds, she maintains, for any possible circumstance a person might 
occupy-for her contingency plan for being in any possible circumstance 
whatsoever is to maximize her hedonic prospects. She thus takes maximizing 
one’s hedonic prospects to be the thing to do in any possible situation. In 
other words, in her opinion, the concept of being the thing to do is necessar- 
ily coextensive with that of maximizing one’s hedonic prospects. If necessary 
coextension amounts to constitution, this amounts to saying that maximiz- 
ing one’s hedonic prospects constitutes being the thing to do. The metaphysi- 
cal jargon I’m employing is just a fancy way of putting something 
ordinary-even vulgar, some would say-that Hedda maintains. 
Perhaps, though, constitution involves a kind of explanatory dependency 
as ~ e 1 1 . l ~  Being water depends on being H20, is explained by being H20, in a 
way that doesn’t reverse; that, perhaps, is why what constitutes being water is 
being H 2 0  but not the other way around. Water is what it is because it is 
H20, but we don’t say that H20 is what it is because it is water. Now I don’t 
know how we might best formulate this asymmetry, but informally, it seems 
to work too with Hedda’s views on being the thing to do: If an act is the 
thing to do, she’ll maintain, that’s because it maximizes the agent’s hedonic 
prospects. She won’t claim that it maximizes one’s hedonic prospects because 
it’s the thing to do. 
Hedda thinks that with being the thing to do and maximizing one’s hedonic 
prospects, a single, natural property is in play. Still, she must insist, these 
are two distinct concepts: the practical concept of being the thing to do, and 
the descriptive concept of maximizing one’s hedonic prospects. The test for 
concepts is what agreement or disagreement consists in. Percy, imagine, is a 
perfectionist: his universal plan, for any possible situation one might face, is 
to do what in prospect most promotes his perfection. He has, let’s imagine, 
some explicit, descriptive characterization of what makes for perfection; call 
this percifection. Take, then, any choice situation in which, as Hedda and 
Percy agree, going to bed maximizes one’s hedonic prospects, but staying up 
and doing piano exercises maximize one’s prospects for percifection. They 
disagree on which of these is the thing to do in that situation, though they 
agree on which maximizes one’s hedonic prospects. 
” See Kripke, “Naming and Necessity” (1972), pp. 126-29, on water as a natural kind, in 
counterfactual circumstances. 
l 4  Kim, Supervenience and Mind (1993). pp. 149-56, defines a concept of “strong 
covariance” and then characterizes supervenience as this plus a kind of asymmetric 
dependence. He argues that this entails at least infinite reducibility. 
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Let me pause here to stress one lesson of this example: in questions of 
what’s the thing to do, thinking needn’t make it so. Hedda may think that in 
her situation, the thing to do is to head for bed-and this may fit perfectly her 
comprehensive, hedonistic view of how to live. But Percy disagrees on what’s 
the thing to do in her situation, and whether or not he is right, his view is 
coherent. So if Hedda and Percy are each coherent and they disagree, which of 
them is right? To come to a view on that, you and I must ourselves think 
how to live. In particular, we must settle what to do if in Hedda’s exact situa- 
tion. Hedda’s own, coherent decision needn’t settle the matter: we can judge 
that she is wrong. And if we do, then whether we are right or she is won’t be 
settled by the metapractical claims I have been making. The question will be 
how to live-what, ultimately, to seek in one’s actions and plans. 
3. The Argument for Natural Constitution 
Hedda, as I have stipulated her plans, thinks in effect that she knows what 
constitutes being the thing to do: the property of holding out maximal 
hedonic prospects. This Moore would count as a natural property, and so in 
this sense, she thinks that there is a natural property that constitutes being 
the thing to do. Most of us, though, aren’t in her condition: we’re not pure 
egoistic hedonists-and we aren’t pure perfectionists either. Most of us don’t 
have a fully worked out basic view on how to live; we muddle though. Yet I 
am claiming that as deciders and planners, we are each committed to this 
claim of constitution: that there is a property that constitutes being the thing 
to do, and it is, in some sense, a natural property. Why do I say this? 
The key lies in the workings of hyperdecided states. In a hyperdeclded 
state, remember, one has settled on a universal plan, a plan for what to do in 
any possible circumstance. Now a planner must identify acts in terms of their 
natural properties: a plan, say, always to do whatever is the thing to do is no 
plan at all. A universal plan can take the infinite form, in situation S1 do the 
act with natural property P I ,  in situation Sz do the act with natural property 
Pz, and so on. From this, we can construct the grand property, having PI in 
Sl ,  P2 in S2, etc. Call this property P*; the plan is, then, in any possible 
situation, to do the act with this grand property P*. In a hyperdecided state, 
this shows, one accepts that there is a property that constitutes being the 
thing to do-namely P*. And this property is constructed, finitely or infi- 
nitely, out of natural properties. 
What, then, of the rest of us: ordinary, doubt-ridden humanity, who are far 
from hyperdecided. To elicit the logic of our concepts, I’ll work with a vast 
idealization, that my ordinary Joe, uncertain though he is, is nevertheless 
consistent. We return now to the Principle of Commitment that I defended at 
the end of the Section before last. Consider the many ways that Joe could 
become hyperdecided without changing his mind on anything. Take a conclu- 
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sion Q that he would accept no matter what decided state he might come to be 
in without changing his mind. This, then, is something to which Joe is 
committed; it is entailed by what he already accepts. The principle, then, reads 
as follows: 
PRINCIPLE OF COMMITMENT. A person is committed to a claim Q 
if in every coherent hyperdecided state he could reach without chang- 
ing his mind, he would accept Q. 
Now in any hyperdecided state whatsoever, we have been saying, Joe 
would accept the Claim of Constitution. A fortiori, he accepts the Claim of 
Constitution in any hyperdecided state he could reach without changing his 
mind about anything. The Principle of Commitment thus applies to him, and 
so he is committed to the Claim of Constitution, whatever his other uncer- 
tainties. And so are you, so am I, and so is any planner. 
Having established what we are all committed to, I can now assert it: 
There is a property-natural in a sense-that constitutes being the thing to 
do. So say I, and so must you agree; this is the transcendental turn in the 
argument. 
In metaethical discussions, people often talk as if certain properties were 
peculiarly moral. The question then seems to press theorists, whether these 
are some subclass of natural properties, or some special kind of non-natural 
property-r whether there are no such properties at all. Morality has not 
directly been my topic; I have rather been seeing what happens if we start in a 
realm in which expressivism has to be right, with expressions of decisions. 
My conclusions about practical thought have then turned out to mirror much 
of what G.E. Moore says in a metaethical vein. The property that constitutes 
being the thing to do might indeed be complex, the resultant of a balancing 
of diverse considerations. Even if it is, however, that leaves another contrast 
that is crucial to understanding practical thought. The pattern I have described, 
after all, applies even if the property that constitutes being the thing to do is 
a natural property of a plain and straightforward kind. It applies if, say, an 
egoistic hedonist like Hedda is right, and this property is that of maximizing 
one’s hedonic prospects. Moore’s non-naturalism might best be freely read as 
a doctrine not about properties but about concepts. Call the property that 
constitutes being the thing to do P*, and let D be a descriptive concept of this 
property. Moore’s point, so emended, is this: people who disagree about 
what’s the thing to do don’t necessarily disagree on which acts are D. Their 
disagreement may not be descriptive, but purely a matter of what to do and 
how to live. In philosophers’ jargon, it may be practical. 
Here, then, is a slogan: All properties are natural, but not all concepts of 
properties are descriptive. Some instead are practical. 
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4. What Sort of Property 
What kind of property does the proof I have given establish? What kind of 
property must this be, the property that constitutes being the thing to do? 
For sure, it can’t be a natural property in the sense that we conceive it, as 
we plan, in terms of fundamental physics. We cannot guide our lives by any- 
thing so esoteric: “Keep away from radioactivity” would surely be a good part 
of a plan for living, if only we knew how to tell what’s radioactive--but not 
much help if we don’t. Plans, it seems, must be couched in terms of features 
that we can recognize: features of contingencies and features of options. Both 
these must be available to the person who follows the plan. “Buy low, sell 
high” is no plan we can implement. The building blocks of a contingency 
plan must be concepts that are recognitional, concepts in terms of which we 
can recognize the circumstance we’re in, and in terms of which we can settle 
what to do and so do it. 
What, then, of the property that constitutes being the thing to do? It is 
constructed, I have said, from the properties of contingencies and options. A 
hyperplan could go, “In contingency C1 do act A 1, in contingency C2 do act 
Az.  and so on.” It thus amounts to a plan to do all and only acts with this 
property: being act A in contingency C1, or act A in contingency Cz, and 
so on. 
This talk of properties, though, is misleading. A plan is couched in con- 
cepts, not in properties separate from how they are conceived. I don’t follow a 
plan just by glomming on to a property, but by conceiving it in terms of 
certain concepts. It’s concepts, not properties, that are recognitional or not. 
The property of being wet may be identical to the property of having H20 
adhering, but these concepts are not the same. If I don’t know chemistry, 1’11 
still recognize things as wet, but not through any such chemical concept. I 
should be talking, then, not in the first instance about the property that con- 
stitutes being the thing to do, but about a concept of it. 
Speak, then, of the concept that realizes being the thing to do. This con- 
cept, I have been arguing, must be composable, though perhaps only infi- 
nitely, from recognitional concepts. Let’s term this a recognitionally 
grounded concept. The relation I’ve been treating as constitution, then, 
begins with this relation among concepts, the relation of a concept’s realizing 
being the thing to do. We start with a practical concept, the concept of being 
the thing to do, and now see that some recognitionally grounded concept real- 
izes it. By that I mean, at least in part, that necessarily, all and only acts that 
fit this concept are things to do. 
This concept is the concept of a property, but the same property may also 
be realized by other concepts-esoteric scientific concepts, for instance. Only 
recognitional concepts figure in plans fully specified. There is a property that 
constitutes being the thing to do, and a recognitionally grounded concept real- 
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izes this property. The concept is naturalistic in this sense, and we could call 
the property natural, in the sense that it is picked out by such a naturalistic 
concept. In our new lingo, then, we can speak of the recognitionally grounded 
concept that realizes being the thing to do. (Hedda thinks that this is the con- 
cept of offering top hedonic prospects.) The pure planning concept being the 
thing to do likewise realizes this same property, but it is a distinct concept. 
A concept that realizes being the thing to do is, I have argued, construc- 
table out of recognitional concepts. The construction, though, might be infi- 
nite, for all the logic of planning by itself establishes; only in this loose way 
has the concept been proved naturalistic. I myself would find it bizarre if what 
to do were infinitely arbitrary, without discernible rationale. To think that i t  
is would be to settle on leading one’s life without discernible rationale. That 
is not, I am sure, the way to live-but nothing in the proof I have given 
speaks to this further claim. The question is an aspect of how to live: whether 
being the thing to do has an intelligible rationale. Answering this is beyond 
the powers of sheer logic, the logic how to live. 
5. Thick Recognition 
Understandings of one’s situation, we might fear or might hope, can’t always 
be factored into separate components of how things are, on the one hand, and 
what to do on the other. I may just “see” that Jason is sensitive, and seeing 
this can’t be separated from finding reason to spare his feelings. Jason’s being 
“shy and sensitive” is already practically laden for me: in finding him sensi- 
tive, I am already motivated to tread carefully on his fee1i11gs.l~ (Or perhaps if 
I’m a bully, I am already motivated to bait him.) 
Now this, if it is right, might seem to impugn the picture I have been 
sketching. If I recognize my situation by its demands, won’t I, in my plan- 
ning, have to include these demands in my specification of the circumstances 
for which I plan a given response? If so, it may seem, then I cannot have my 
sharp distinction between what to do and how things are, the distinction I 
have helped myself to throughout my argument. What to do is built into cir- 
cumstances for which I must plan. 
Let me accept that apprehensions of one’s situation can be heavy with 
demands for action. I may just perceive maggots on a slab of meat as disgust- 
ing, and to do this is to shy away from the scene. Feelings may come before 
recognition of an object, so that, say, disgust comes before recognizing the 
maggots as such. You do not, then, apprehend the scene in terms free of all 
valence for what to do, and then proceed to make your decisions. The same 
will no doubt go for more complex apprehensions of social situations: appre- 
‘’ McDowell, “Hypothetical Imperatives?’ (1978). p. 21. 
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hending how things are often won’t be separate from having a strong sense of 
what to do.16 
All this I am eager to accommodate-in the right way. Distinguish two 
ways in which we might try to accept these points. Only one of them is ten- 
able, I’ll argue; the other would yield monstrous directives for how to live. 
On the one hand, I’ll agree, among an agent’s circumstances is the fact that 
she has the sense she has of what her situation demands. Realizing that Jason 
is sensitive might involve having a sense that the way Jason is tells against 
joshing him. That Kathy has this sense may indeed be part of her situation. It 
is, though, a psychological aspect, not plan-laden in itself. Describing Kathy 
as having this sense does not at all commit us, logically, to being protective 
if in her shoes. A bully might plan for the case of being like Kathy and so 
having this sense that Jason is not to be joshed, and dismiss her concerns as 
wimpish, planning to weigh Jason’s hurt feelings entirely in favor of joshing 
him. The bully is depraved but not thereby short on logic. 
A stronger claim on this score must, though, be rejected. The untenable 
claim is that we must accommodate more than this, that when Kathy finds 
her circumstances to cany protective demands, we must recognize, as among 
her circumstances, that the situation indeed does carry these demands. If we 
were to accept this, then I agree, we would not be describing her situation in 
the kinds of terms I have in mind in speaking of plans for living. The terms 
we use will not bracket all questions of what to do. 
The principle we’d need to accept in order to do this, though, is appalling. 
More to the point, the principle constitutes no demand of practical reason; it 
is one that a planner can reject without confusion. Our contingency planning, 
after all-even that of the most virtuous person imaginable-can include 
hypothetical decisions for the case of being vicious. Indeed part of genuine 
human virtue surely consists in just this: potentials for responding viciously 
are in us all, and we need to be prepared. Now, the vicious as well as the vir- 
tuous can experience a situation as demanding action. Turned vicious, I might 
find that a man’s sexual persona demands bashing him up. I might be incapa- 
ble of untangling my factual basis for this judgment from the glory, as 1 see 
it, of bashing up such a pathetic excuse for a man. A hyperplan covers all 
possible circumstances a person might be in, and so it covers this situation 
among others. 
How, then, should I plan for such a plight? By discriminating, we might 
try answering, between virtuous and vicious sensings of what one’s situation 
demands. What is it, though, when I view a hypothetical situation, to regard 
the demand-sensings I’d have in it as virtuous? Isn’t it just to fall in, in my 
contingency plans for the situation, with the demands that I’d be sensing? 
Isn’t it to give some weight, hypothetically, to meeting those seeming 
l6 Zajonc, “Feeling and Thinking’’ (1980). 
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demands in that situation? What kinds of being “wimpish”, as some would 
describe it, are vicious and what kinds virtuous? The answer doesn’t come in 
advance of thinking how to live and what matters in living with others. Join 
me in thinking, then, what to do in the bashing case. In the situation w e k  
planning for, one senses a seeming demand to bash, and we-the real we who 
are deciding hypothetically for that circumstanc-an resolve to resist. We 
can each say to ourselves, “If something about a man I can’t put my finger 
on seems to demand bashing him up, don’t bash him, and work to get rid of 
my proclivity to sense such a demand.” 
As theorists of contingency planning, then, we need a framework that 
allows raising the question of whether a seeming demand is a veridical, 
whether it is a demand to fall in with. We must distinguish, in contingency 
planning, whether a sense I might have of what my plight demands is virtu- 
ous or vicious. And this brings us back to the first way of accommodating 
psychological point that situations may be recognized by their seeming 
demands. 
Indeed we could lead ourselves back to that way just by thinking about 
contingency planning itself. It is no part of contingency planning to decide, 
hypothetically, 
If something about a man really demands bashing, then bash him! (5 )  
Or at least this is no part of contingency planning on the plainest interpreta- 
tion of dictum (5) .  On this interpretation, the imperative (5 )  is analytic, but it 
applies to no possible circumstance. It is analytic in that it specifies the cir- 
cumstance as one in which the man is, for no clear reason, to be bashed. It is 
inapplicable, though-and this is a substantive, practical claim-in that there 
are no such circumstances. To make the principle a genuine candidate for 
inclusion in a contingency plan, we would have to interpret the antecedent 
psychologically: 
If something about a man seems to call for bashing, then bash him! (6) 
But then the hypothetical decision is one a planner can reject-and that I hope 
we all do reject. 
6. Normativity 
I haven’t been claiming overtly that my topic was normativity. My subject 
has been contingency planning, and the states of mind that could figure in it. 
These states of mind are possible, I have argued, if it is possible to agree or 
disagree in plans for living. If this is possible, then we are all committed to 
marks of realism in questions of how to live. The conclusions I drew sounded 
metaphysical: there is a property that constitutes being the thing to do in a 
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situation, and there is a concept of that property that realizes being the thing 
to do. The concept is recognitionally based, and does not have demands for 
action built in. In this sense, the concept is descriptive and naturalistic, and 
the property is a natural property. Plan-laden concepts do signify natural 
properties, and in this regard, a naturalistic “practical realist” of a Cornell 
stripe would be right. A Moore-like non-naturalist would also, in a sense, be 
right: plan-laden concepts are not descriptive or naturalistic. Now perhaps, I’ll 
voice a suspicion, we are familiar already with such plan-laden concepts, and 
our term of art for them is ‘normative’. Whether this is so needs further 
inquiry. 
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